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Abstract 
 
This chapter investigates the concept and theological use of philosophy in Scotland after 
John Mair. Until the 1570s, philosophy in Scotland was in the tradition of scholasticism. After 
the Reformation, Melville’s university reform changed the philosophical landscape. Across 
Europe, the first generation of the reformers had taught that scholasticism and Aristotle were 
not necessary for the Christian faith, and philosophers and theologians alike had to rethink the 
traditional scholasticism of Catholic legacy. This intellectual change is traced here with a 
focus on the role, scope and autonomy of philosophy with respect to theology. After the 
dismissal of Aristotelo-scholasticism, both scholasticism and Aristotelianism survived in the 
universities in new forms adapted to Reformation theology. Aristotle in particular, regarded as 
the personification of unassisted natural reason, retained his importance. The status of 
Aristotle is a good indicator of the prevailing concept of philosophy. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one covers the progression from John 
Mair to Andrew Melville. Section two discusses the differences between scholasticism and 
humanist Aristotelianism. Finally, sections three and four analyse some late sixteenth- and 
early seventeenth-century texts by Andrew Melville, Robert Rollock and five university 
philosophers: William Robertson, William Craig, John Adamson, John Petrie, and John Knox. 
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Sixteenth-Century Philosophy and Theology after John Mair 
 
 
1. From Mair to Melville 
 
In his commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (1530), John Mair writes that: 
 
In almost all Aristotle’s opinions he agrees with the Catholic and true Christian faith in 
all its integrity. He constantly asserts the free will of man. […] in so great and manifold 
a work [i.e., the Ethics] you meet scarcely a single opinion unworthy of a Christian 
gentleman. (Broadie 2009: 58) 
 
Few years earlier, Martin Luther had famously attacked Aristotelo-scholasticism in the 
Disputation against Scholastic Theology (1517): 
 
§41. Virtually the entire Ethics of Aristotle is the worst enemy of grace. Against all the 
scholastics. 
§43. It is wrong to say that no one can become a theologian without Aristotle. 
§50. Briefly, the whole Aristotle is to theology as darkness to light. Against all the 
scholastics.1 
 
For John Mair and his ‘circle’ logic and philosophy were ‘theologians’ tools’ (Broadie 2009: 
87, 47−84). The ‘theological use’ of philosophy was to provide logical and dialectical 
resources for the intelligence of faith. Their commentaries on Aristotle’s corpus, especially 
logic, display a very humanistic attention to the Greek text but always as part of a broader 
theological outlook. 
A man of the old system, John Mair was nonetheless aware of the complex relations 
between philosophy and theology, humanism and scholasticism. The tensions between 
scholastics and humanists are discussed in his fictional Dialogus de materia theologo 
tractanda in the commentary on the first book of the Sentences (1510). Gavin Douglas, 
humanist poet and provost, complains of the excessive reliance on Aristotle over the church 
fathers, that philosophy is a source of obscurity rather than clarity for theologians, and claims 
 
1 ‘§41 Tota fere Aristotelis Ethica pessima est gratiae inimica. Contra scholasticos; §43 Error est dicere sine 
Aristotele non fit theologus; §50 Breviter totus Aristoteles ad theologiam est tenebre ad lucem. Contra 
scholasticos.’ Translations are my own. 
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that only salvation matters, as in Paul II Timotheus 3:14−5. David Cranston, scholastic 
theologian and philosopher, replies that theology cannot be inconsistent with philosophy 
because of the unity of truth, and that Aristotelian logic is complementary to theology. 
Douglas ascribes the prolixity of the scholastic books to ‘the vain pride of those thinkers’ 
(Broadie 2009: 55). Between Mair’s and Luther’s opposite attitudes towards philosophy, in 
post-Reformation Scotland the concept of Aristotle, and of philosophy, was closer to Mair’s 
‘Christian gentleman’ than to Luther’s ‘destroyer of good doctrine’ (Kusukawa 1995: 36).2 
Luther’s hatred for philosophy and Calvin’s understanding of philosophy as a sceptical 
self-defeating discipline set much of the respective philosophical agendas in Wittenberg and 
Geneva. In Scotland, the Reformation was a communal enterprise without a single leading 
figure (Wright 2004: 176) and John Knox, arguably the most prominent Scottish reformer, 
exerted only an indirect influence on philosophy. A student of Mair’s, Knox was a preacher, 
not a systematic thinker, who had little to say in the way of philosophy provided that 
philosophy remained within due limits. A similar communal character is true of sixteenth-
century academic philosophy, a remarkable fact considering the uniform content of the 
philosophy texts from the 1590s and 1600s. 
In the years after the Reformation scholasticism lingered in the Scottish universities. 
Though lacking originality, it is unfair to describe it as generally conservative since ‘quite a 
large number of Scottish Aristotelian purists carefully expounded Aristotle’s ideas’ with a 
humanist spirit (Broadie 2009: 96). Calls for the reform of the “old scholasticism” of the 
universities were common but it was only with Andrew Melville’s university reform from the 
1570s that a new, consciously post-scholastic, comprehensive account of the relationship of 
philosophy to theology emerged. 
Melville overhauled the curriculum with the introduction of humanist studies and 
specialised teachers, the dismissal of metaphysics, and a specific theological use of humanist 
philosophy, namely Ramism. In logic, dialectic and rhetoric, Pierre de la Ramée conceived a 
reform of the arts curriculum characterised by anti-Aristotelianism, order as the universal 
method, the practical orientation of theory, and innovative methods of presentation, such as 
the dichotomous diagrams. Melville used Ramism as a quick and effective way to disseminate 
the new curriculum inspired by Presbyterianism, so that ‘it was precisely the “pragmatism” of 
Ramism that Melville found attractive, not its radicalism’ (Reid 2011: 60). A new theology 
and a new method of presentation came with new philosophical content too. The curriculum 
 
2 Letter to Latomus (1521): “Thomas Aquinas wrote a great deal of heresy, and is responsible for the reign of 
Aristotle, the destroyer of good doctrine.” 
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was broadened to include humanist disciplines and Ramist dialectic, but its philosophical 
content retained a ‘near-monolithic focus on Aristotle’ (Reid 2011: 9), especially in natural 
and moral philosophy. Melville’s humanist strategy to ‘subvert the scholastic version of 
Aristotle ... should not be interpreted as constituting opposition to Aristotle himself’ 
(Holloway 2011: 80). Hence, ‘at its core, the “Melvillian” reform programme comprised a 
humanist refocusing on Aristotle in the original Greek’ and ‘the small set of theses extant for 
the “Melvillian” period are almost entirely occupied with the exposition of Aristotelian texts 
and ideas’ (Reid 2011: 49, 195). 
The next section analyses the distinction of scholasticism and Aristotle, and how 
Melville’s specialised humanist curriculum promoted a conscious and discipline-specific use 
of Aristotle. 
 
 
2. Scholasticism and Aristotelianism 
Far from ‘revolting against Aristotle’ (Rait 1899), Melville regarded Aristotle as an 
intellectual and pedagogical resource. In the histories of the Scottish Reformation, old and 
recent alike, the perception of Catholicism, scholasticism and Aristotle as correlated somehow 
led to overlooking the most immediate background of the Reformation and to regarding it as 
intrinsically conservative. In the past decades, scholars in different areas have revised the 
relationship of Reformation and scholasticism. Charles Schmitt gave currency to the idea of a 
distinction between scholasticism and Aristotelianism and of the varieties of Renaissance 
Aristotelianisms (Schmitt 1983). Richard Muller argued for the enduring importance of 
scholasticism in the formulation of Reformed orthodoxy (Muller 1987). John Durkan showed 
how pervasive Latin culture was in pre-Reformation Scotland, and argued that some 
intellectual resources of the early Reformation could come only from pre-existing institutions, 
such as grammar schools and universities (Durkan 1959). 
Richard Muller has described scholasticism as a technical and logical approach to theology 
lasting from around the twelfth to the eighteenth century. It is a method, mostly academic, of 
exposition of a truth considered as orthodox. It cannot be a descriptor of a thinker, at least not 
any more than ‘analytic’ is today. Scholastic theology is different from, but also consistent 
with and complementary to, catechetical, exegetical, and homiletical theology. Scholasticism 
does not indicate a specific theologico-philosophic content, although changes in method tend 
to produce changes in form: for example, a scholastic treatise vis-a-vis a pulpit sermon 
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(Muller 2004: 140−141).3 The Reformers consciously worked in a plurality of theologies. 
What remained in the post-Reformation Scottish universities is scholasticism as a method, 
consciously detached from the specific content and curriculum inherited from medieval 
scholasticism. Late sixteenth-century Scottish philosophy belongs to the ‘early period’ of the 
formulation of Reformed orthodoxy (Muller 2004: 134). The received body of philosophy 
was adjusted to the new faith: the systematic elaboration and institutionalisation of theology, 
apologetics, pastoral duties and teaching. 
When the Reformed theologians read the scriptures without the medieval commentators, 
traditional scholasticism fell out of favour. Specific philosophical content was connoted with 
Catholicism, such as natural theology and metaphysics as the science of god, but philosophy 
remained overwhelmingly Aristotelian, especially in logic, physics and moral philosophy, 
with the addition of classical authors such as Cicero, Seneca and Pliny. The shift in the 
enduring importance of Aristotle is captured by Broadie: ‘Identifying Aristotle as the 
philosopher, just as the scholastic philosophers did, post-Mair Scottish philosophers sought 
(unlike the scholastics) to return to his system and to see it in its pristine state, in Greek’ 
(Broadie 2009: 102). The question is how and why this ‘pristine Aristotle’ fit in the newly 
Reformed universities. 
While Melville predictably ‘comdemned those aspects in Aristotle’s ‘doctrine directlie 
impugning the grounds of religioun’’ (Kirk 1994: 298), he integrated into the curriculum the 
many positive aspects of Aristotelianism. In a humanist fashion, reference to the Greek 
Aristotle was anti-scholastic as well as anti-Catholic. The Scottish humanist Aristotle did not 
necessarily represent a worldview incompatible with Christianity. He spoke of God and 
metaphysics disproportionately less than of biology, the movement of falling bodies, and 
logical inferences. Aristotle was divorced from scholasticism and celebrated for giving a 
consistent account of the world described with the powers, and within the limits, of the 
unassisted human mind. Also, Aristotle still provided a usable set of doctrines, terms, 
concepts and arguments: a “scholastic” Aristotle in the sense of being tuned to the needs of 
academic teaching, but not anymore the Aristotle cornerstone of the scholastic worldview. 
Philosophy remained propaedeutic to theology and the theoretical and practical need of a 
“synthesis” of theology and philosophy was declined in different terms. For the late sixteenth-
century Scottish academics the “theological use” of philosophy was to separate the respective 
spheres of validity of theology and philosophy in order to minimise overlaps and conflicts. 
 
3 For a different account, see Alexander Broadie’s chapter in this volume. 
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While Catholic scholasticism was the product of centuries of harmonisation of the conflicts of 
reason and revelation, the Scots separated in order to harmonise. Philosophy was self-
contained and silent on matters spiritual and of salvation. Natural theology and metaphysics 
were dropped by Melville as problematic and excessively rationalising in religion. 
Philosophy, especially moral and natural, was applicable only within strict, mundane limits. 
Additionally, the new theological practices prompted discussions on philosophy’s own 
method and limits: particularly important were Ramus’s Dialectics and Aristotle’s Posterior 
Analytics. Whereas the consistency of Aristotle in the absence of revelation had troubled the 
medievals, the Scots saw it as a resource, and in the long term this separation helped 
legitimise (again) philosophy vis-a-vis theology. 
The enduring importance of Aristotle in post-Reformation Scotland was both a necessity 
and an innovation of the best humanist scholarship of the time, not a survival of the old 
Catholic system. The intelligence of the Reformed faith became less reliant on the 
Christianisation of Aristotle. 
 
 
3. Melville and Rollock 
Melville wrote the Scholastica diatriba in rebus divinis (1599) for the graduand class of St 
Mary’s College, St Andrews. The adjective ‘scholastic’ refers principally to the institutional 
setting of the theses, although the question-response structure is suggestive of the scholastic 
method in theology. Melville has a positive opinion of philosophy. The opening section is a 
list of questions for the students to debate on graduation day, such as whether theology and 
scripture ought to be judged by the arts and science, products of human ingenuity, or the 
contrary; whether the spiritual teaching of Paul ought to be submitted to the scientific criteria 
of Aristotle’s Analytics; or whether natural truth and physics, and supernatural truth and 
Mosaic physics, contradict one another (Melville 1599: 1, 5, 9, 11). 
Melville teaches that the fall has inescapable consequences for humankind but his view is a 
moderate one. He argues against the pretension that all knowledge has an empirical origin: ‘it 
is surely not certain that famous dogma of the peripatetics, that nothing is in the intellect 
which has not been earlier in the senses’ (Melville 1599: XVI).4 Since Adam’s mind is the 
root of all science and his mind is in the image of God’s mind, then Adam’s mind possesses 
some original (that is, non-empirical) knowledge. 
 
4 ‘Ergo non adeo certum dogma illud Peripateticorum, nihil esse intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.’ 
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The discussion of free will and grace is a common place for the exhibition of the “limits” 
of philosophy. Melville is a voluntarist in moral agency: 
 
Free will is the free faculty of the mind, by its own movement without coercion, to 
approve or disapprove, to choose or to reject that which the intellect or mind says it 
ought to be chosen or rejected. (Melville 1599: XXII)5 
 
Origin of evil is in the deficient free will because all created things are good so they cannot be 
the origin of evil (Melville 1600: II). Human free will is acknowledged with the crucial 
remark that ‘we believe that the fallen man is still left with mind and will’ only in the 
everyday moral decisions (Melville 1599: XXIII). Concerning the spiritual kingdom of Christ 
and salvation ‘although man can will some natural and moral goods, nonetheless in this way 
or without grace man cannot will what he ought to: so that no matter how remarkable these 
faculties seem to be before humankind, before God they only deserve eternal death.’ (Melville 
1599: XXIII)6 
The autonomy of philosophy in moral matters and its blindness in spiritual matters is 
mirrored in the distinction between natural and divine law. ‘Natural law, by way of notions 
naturally common to us, informs us naturally by what natural way we can reach our natural 
goal. So men are naturally inexcusable in their conscience with respect to natural law. Divine 
law instead stems from revelation and pertains to the things ‘above nature’. Human law is 
born out of natural and divine law, and it is less perfect ‘because of human weakness.’ 
(Melville 1597: XXVI)7 
In the Diatriba, Melville accepted the possibility of a limited natural knowledge of God, of 
the natural world, and of our offices, but he denied the possibility of a functional natural 
knowledge which could be used to construct a true and reliable natural theology. Hence, his 
distaste for metaphysics but not for philosophy tout court. 
 
Martin Luther’s hatred for philosophy found scriptural justification in Paul’s Epistle to the 
Colossians 2:8. In Robert Rollock’s Lectures, the passage reads: ‘Beware least there be any 
 
5 ‘Liberum arbitrium est libera animae facultas probandi vel improbandi eligendi vel respuendi sua proprio motu 
sine coactione, id quod intellectus seu mens eligendum vel respuendum esse dicat.’ And Melville 1597: IX. 
6 ‘Licet autem quaedam Naturalia et moralia bona velle possit, tamen neque eo modo nec sine ea vult aut velle 
potest quo debet: adeo ut quantumvis speciosa illa coram hominibus videantur esse, coram Deo aeternam 
mortem mereantur.’ And Melville 1600: XXVI. 
7 ‘Lex Naturalis notionibus natura communibus naturaliter informat via naturali ad finem naturalem obtinendum, 
Divina notionibus supra naturam et communibus et singularibus informat divinitus […] Utriusque veluti partus 
est lex humana, quanquam ab utraque non parum deficiat ob humanam infirmitatem.’ 
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man that spoyles you through Philosophie, and vaine deceit, through the traditions of men, 
according to the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.’ (Rollock 1603: 151)8 Rollock’s 
analysis of this passage is instructive of the differences from Luther. The discussion of 
Colossians 2:8 in a sermon suggests that the argument of the separation of the spheres of 
validity of theology and philosophy was not confined to academic discussions and that it was 
directed at a lay audience. 
Rollock uses the metaphor of the believers as ‘sheepe’ who are ‘prayed’ away: ‘The 
manner how they doe this; is not by strong hand or by violence, but it is by Philosophie, by 
deceiving of the sheepe’. The targets are the Papists, who deceive people with ‘their 
Philosophie, that is their deceit, and vanitie in doctrine ... Philosophie. A faire name to be 
called wisedome, but hee gives it as foule a name afterward, when he names it vaine deceit’. 
Besides this anti-papist polemics, Rollocks has a positive view of philosophy: 
 
the wisedome of man so long as it is within the bounds of things that are earthly and 
wordly, thaings naturall, thaings concerning policie; it will have some soliditie: but so 
soone as the head of a man, albeit never so ingenious and learned, reacheth without the 
bounds of earthly and naturall things, & begins to climbe up to heaven, and to seeke out 
God and his worship; there the head of man vanisheth and becomes foolishness. 
(Rollock 1603: 152) 
 
For Rollock, there is an improper use of philosophy, when philosophy concerns itself with 
matters spiritual and falls prey of foolishness and arrogance, when deception is ‘dyed with the 
colour of wisedome’; and a proper use of philosophy, limited to things natural and of societal 
life. The improper use of philosophy beyond its limits deceives men, not philosophy itself. In 
the Analysis Dialectica on Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, Rollock makes a similar argument 
with respect to moral life. Human beings are inexcusable because god’s light shines in the 
visible things, hence a natural theology is available without revelation (Rollock 1593: 17−18). 
After the fall, some sanctity is left because humans are in the image of god: this little spark 
(‘scintillula’) is enough to incline us towards human and natural good, but not to spiritual 
 
8 Here and below emphasis is original. 
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good (Rollock 1593: 157−158).9 Only sanctity will modify free will from indifference and 
openness to opposites (good and evil) to spontaneity towards the good (Rollock 1593: 153). 
The concepts of philosophy and natural reason in Rollock’s Lectures and Analysis are not 
different from those taught in the Scottish universities. 
 
 
4. Academic philosophy 
There are only a few philosophy graduation theses available from the 1590s and 1600s. 
The theses are handy compendia of the philosophy and interpretation of Aristotle that were 
deemed fitting for Reformed institutions. They also hint at the ‘long seventeenth century’ 
trajectory of Scottish academic philosophy (see Conclusion). The earliest theses available are 
some years later than the peak of Melville’s influence on the universities, hence they shed 
light on the his immediate legacy. The first are the Theses philosophicae (1596) by the 
Edinburgh regent William Robertson. The theme of the Fall is treated after Logic, and it 
introduces physics. It is not clear whether the regent believed that logic is somewhat less 
affected by the fall than natural philosophy. 
 
Because of the lamentable Fall, not only is the will darkened throughout its acts, due to 
a paralysis through licentious affects, but also the mind ... The grievous human 
condition is not only in need of the cure of practical training, but also of the eye-
medicine and sun of the contemplative science. (Robertson 1596: Th.Ph. 1.2)10 
 
Human mental powers are essentially affected by the original fall, but contemplative science 
is regarded as a partial remedy to it. The view that some truth is available to the unassisted 
powers of the mind echoes Rollock’s idea that the knowledge of the natural world falls within 
the ‘proper’ use of philosophy. Optimism regarding the autonomy and heuristic powers of 
philosophy is present in Robertson’s view of metaphysics: 
 
 
9 ‘Hoc enim esset dicere in voluntate humana aliquid rectitudinis et sanctitatis quae est ad imaginem dei, etiam 
post lapsum permanere ... naturam hominis certo quodam modo propendere ad ista quae moralia ac humana 
bona dicimus, abhorrere vero a coelestibus ac spiritualibus.’ 
10 ‘Lapsu flebili, non modo paralysi dissoluti affectus, transuersum acta voluntas, sed ... tenebris obtenebrata 
mens. Lugubris conditio humana non modo disciplinæ practicæ medelam, sed & scientiæ contemplativæ 
collyrium & solem requisiuit.’ 
Gellera: Sixteenth-Century Philosophy and Theology after John Mair 
 10 
Metaphysics, is given the name of ‘first philosophy’ as well as of wisdom, because of 
its amplitude and of the elevated nature of its subject. Theoretical happiness of the mind 
is the contemplation according to metaphysics, that is, according to the highest 
intellectual virtue. (Robertson 1596: Th.Eth. 9)11 
 
Interestingly, this view of metaphysics is in the section on moral philosophy, thus indicating a 
moral dimension to the theoretical enterprise. Against the anti-scholastics and anti-
Aristotelians, Aristotle is praised for connecting the moral life and the contemplation of God: 
 
1. Theoretical happiness, even according to Aristotle, is best placed in the 
contemplation of God the Blessed […] 3. We are not afraid to go against that famous 
sentence that Aristotle shrouded all philosophers in darkness: in truth, the sparks and 
glowing ashes of religiosity shone in him. (Robertson 1596: Th.Eth. 10)12 
 
Calvin’s image of the sparks and glowing ashes still present in the mind after the fall serves 
for a reappraisal of Aristotle. Robertson proposes the equally well-known locus of Aristotle 
the ‘Christian gentleman’, as in John Mair. 
 
In the 1599 theses for the University of Edinburgh regent Craig addressed the relationship 
between Aristotle and the Fall on the crucial question of whether human powers are sufficient 
to achieve happiness. He seems to regard Aristotle less highly than other regents do. 
 
Aristotle considers the sort of human reason by itself pure, complete and uncorrupted, as 
the first origin of happiness, and of the deliberation and election of good virtue. On the 
contrary, since it is revealed by the established truth that humans are intimately deprived 
by the primeval fall of the faculty of well understanding, willing, deciding, choosing, and 
acting, we concur to move away from Aristotle’s opinion on the origin of happiness, 
virtues, and good actions. (Craig 1599: Th.Eth. 1)13 
 
11 ‘Metaphysica, tum propter amplitudinem, tum etiam propter rerum illius scientiae sublimitatem, sicut primae 
Philosophiae, ita etiam sapientiae nomen fortita est. Foelicitas theorica animi contemplatio est secundum 
Metaphysicam, hoc est, virtutem optimam dianoeticam.’ 
12 1. ‘Foelicitas theorica etiam secundum Arist. Doctrinam, in Dei benedicti contemplatione sita est. […] 3. Non 
veremur itaque in eam sententiam ire […] Aristotelem […] Philosophis omnibus caliginem obduxisse: verum 
etiam pietatis scintillas et favillas in eo emicuisse.’ 
13 ‘Aristoteles primum quasi fontem faelicitatis, virtutis deliberationis bonae, et electionis, constituit rationem 
humanam per se puram, integram et incorruptam. Nos itaque, quibus ex agnita veritate revelatum est hominem 
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Moral philosophy unassisted by faith is useless because even the philosophers fall prey to vice 
despite their deep moral instruction (Craig 1599: Th.Eth. 2.2). Nevertheless, Aristotle is 
helpful to analyse how to apply the universal knowledge of good and evil to particular 
conditions. 
 
Regent Adamson (1600), University of Edinburgh, is on the contrary quite laudatory of 
Aristotle’s epistemology, to the point of addressing him as ‘divine philosopher’: 
 
If humans had remained in primeval integrity, they would have known the affections of 
things by their very proper and proximate causes, according to the way of knowing 
explained by Aristotle most ingeniously and wisely in his Posterior Analytics […] Even 
if we do not have many demonstrations which meet the level of accuracy demanded by 
Aristotle, the analytic doctrine should not be judged useless, but rather the divine 
philosopher ought to be admired for it. (Adamson 1600: Th.Log. XV)14 
 
Adamson argues that Aristotle’s “epistemic optimism” is not tenable after the Fall because 
our knowledge of things and of their causes is obscure, and that Aristotle describes the pre-
lapsarian human epistemic situation. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s method serves in the post-
lapsarian state as a limiting method, as a desirable degree of perfection to pursue, at least in 
natural and moral knowledge. Both Craig and Adamson interpret Aristotle as speaking of the 
‘ideal man’ for he lacked the Christian revelation of the original sin. 
Adamson answers positively to Melville’s question in the Scholastica Diatriba whether 
Paul’s teaching is, in principle, open to investigation with the method of Aristotle’s Posterior 
Analytics. When correctly followed, logic and the rules of inference are reliable in the post-
lapsarian state, also in theological matters. An interesting addition to Melville’s question is 
that Adamson declares to be following here ‘the majority of the theologians’ (‘theologorum 
turba’, Adamson 1600: Th.Log. XVI).15 A remark perhaps suggestive of an appreciation of 
 
bene intelligendi, volendi, deliberandi, eligendi, et agendi facultate a lapsu primaevo penitus destitutum esse, ab 
Arist. Sententia de foelicitatis, virtutum, ac bonarum actionum fundamento recedere cogimur.’ 
14 ‘Si perstitisset homo in primaeva illa integritate, affectiones rerum scivisset per proprias proximasque causas, 
secundum sciendi modum ab Aristotele iis Analyticis Posterioribus ingeniosissime simul et sapientissime 
enarratum […] Etsi non ita multas […] ea accuratione quam requirit Aristoteles, praeditas habeamus 
demonstrationes, non tamen ideo Doctrina illa Analytica censenda est inutilis, sed suspiciendus potius divinus 
Philosophus.’ 
15 ‘Cur non etiam Paulinae apodeixeis pneumatikaj, astipulante doctissimorum Theologorum turba, ad 
Analyticum Aristotelicae eruditionis modum, revocandae sunt et exigendae?’ 
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scholasticism, which would regain popularity in the seventeenth-century disputes on 
orthodoxy. 
Elsewhere Adamson seems to overlook the difference between Aristotle and the Christian 
teaching on happiness and virtue. He even finds a way to condemn the heretics − who 
unsurprisingly include the papists − by the letter of Aristotle: ‘according to truth as well as 
Aristotle, the heretics are the worst and most unhappy people,’ for the human happiness 
described by Aristotle is the same as the Christian happiness (Adamson 1600: Th.Pol. V.3, 
VI.1).16 
 
Regent John Petrie taught philosophy at St Salvator’s College, St Andrews, when Andrew 
Melville was dean of the Faculty of Divinity. Petrie’s graduation theses of 1603 are 
suggestive of the type of influence exerted by Melville. 
Two sets of passages are interesting for the concept of philosophy. In the first set, the 
regent presents a brief theory of the division of science. Metaphysics, whose scientific 
achievements are ascribable to the ingenuity of the human mind, is not a science superior to 
all others. A subordinate science is ‘that which receives the subject-matter from a superior 
science, and also retains the main way to treat it. ... It is therefore false that particular 
sciences are subordinate to metaphysics, because they do not retain the same method’ (Petrie 
1603: Th.Disc. 19).17 Petrie uses Aristotle’s view that each discipline has its own method to 
argue that theology is a unique discipline because its method is unique. Theology is best 
understood as ‘the shorter and more exact comprehension of true philosophy’ (Petrie 1603, 
Th.Disc. 24).18 This understanding of metaphysics dismisses the role of terminological 
repertoire and logical connector between theology and natural philosophy which metaphysics 
played in Catholic scholasticism. 
Petrie’s view of Aristotle, natural reason and human happiness is worth quoting at some 
length. Human happiness as in Aristotle is humankind’s ‘inner perfection’ (Petrie 1603: 
Th.Eth. 5), suggestive of a teleological and perfectionist anthropology. Petrie argues that 
‘acting according to virtue, living well, and glorifying God with our life, all go in the same 
 
16 ‘ex veritate, ita etiam ex mente Aristotelis, haereticos [… including the Papists] omnium hominum pessimos 
esse et miserrimos.’ And ‘Felicitas ergo humana Aristoteli, quod et nos Christiani dicimus’. 
17 ‘Scientiam subalternam voco […] quae a superiori subiectum accipit, retento principe eiusdem consyderandi 
modo […] Falsum est ergo particulares scientias Metaphysicae subalternatas esse, cum modum eius 
consyderandi non retineant.’ 
18 ‘non videtur S.Sancta Theologia sacris biblijs consignata in unam aliquam specie Disciplinam tota cogi posse, 
quin potius ea fuerit totius vera Philosophiae brevior exactiorque comprehensio.’ 
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direction’, that is, towards the ‘acquisition of that goal which the most noble theologians say 
is the ultimate goal of theology’: 
 
Why would it be absurd to say, with Aristotle, that the essence of happiness is placed in 
acting according to virtue? Beyond the talk of essence, we acknowledge some errors in 
Aristotle’s view of happiness and we full-heartedly reject them: such errors concern 
happiness’s origin, because he ignored God’s supernatural grace and faith […] Yet, 
even if we place true happiness not in action but in the communion with God, Aristotle 
does seem to have grasped it as well, when he writes that the blessed becomes similar to 
god […] even if he did not put the essence of happiness in this specific type of 
happiness […] How much closer than all other philosophers did our Aristotle get to the 
truth! (Petrie 1603, Th.Eth. 11)19 
 
‘Our Aristotle’ was a fallible man, but his idea of happiness is not in opposition to the 
Christian ideal of the blessed life. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The sources investigated here belong to the late sixteenth-century early formulation of 
Reformed orthodoxy. A general agreement on the nature and scope of philosophy gradually 
emerged. The humanist Aristotle of the sixteenth-century Scottish scholastics found a new 
place in Melville’s curriculum. Melville’s preference for Ramus’s analysis logica over 
syllogistic in the interpretation of the Bible (Kirk 1994: 283), and the sola scriptura principle 
dismissed traditional scholasticism as the framework of the relations of theology and 
philosophy. Nevertheless, coherently with Melville’s idea of specialised university teaching, 
Aristotle remained central in logic, natural and moral philosophy, where no competing 
alternative was available. Rather than just being conservative or old scholastic, Aristotle had a 
specific place in the Reformed universities. 
 
19 ‘Cum igitur secundum virtutem agere, bene vivere, et Deum vita glorificare, in eandem sensum omnia redeant, 
cur is prorsus absurde sentiat qui cum Arist. hactenus de faelicitatis essentia statuat, ea in actione secundum 
virtutem esse positam. Nam praeter essentiam, errores nonnullos Arist. in faelicitatis negotio nos agnoscimus et 
ex animis reijcimus: cuiusmodi est error de eius origine, ignorata supernaturali Dei gratia et fide […] Quin etiam 
si ponamur veram faelicitatem non in actione sed in coniunctione cum Deo, et illam attigisse videtur Arist. 
quatenus scriptum reliquit beatum Deo similem fieri […] etsi in haec faelicitatis essentiam non posuerit. […] 
quanto proprius omnibus alijs Philosophis ad veritatem accesserit Arist. Noster.’ 
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In the early seventeenth century philosophy kept developing in connection with Reformed 
orthodoxy. Following the great Reformed confessions on doctrine, the need for a systematic 
presentation of Reformed orthodoxy became more important. Apologetics, anti-Catholic 
polemics, the needs of university teaching argued for the use of a moderate scholasticism 
along with Aristotle. Medieval authors such as Aquinas and Scotus and contemporary authors 
such as Suárez and Bellarmin were freely used as well as criticised. This prompted some re-
alignments with themes traditionally associated with Catholic scholasticism. The Aberdeen 
Doctors and Robert Baron are a different type of intellectual from the late sixteenth-century 
philosophy regent and are representative of a return to scholasticism in the Scottish 
universities from the 1610s. Quite tellingly, the subtitle of Baron’s Philosophia Theologiae 
Ancillans (1621) reads: ‘A pious and modest explanation of the philosophical questions in the 
theological disputations’ (original emphasis). In the Metaphysica Generalis (1654) Baron 
treats metaphysics as the architectonic, connecting science between philosophy and theology. 
The harmonisation of revelation and reason is structured as a theoretical discipline, not just as 
a spiritual matter. 
The interpretation of Aristotle responded to new theological needs as well. Not only was 
Aristotle compatible with Reformed orthodoxy, he also became an apologetic tool against the 
Catholics. The Scottish regents believed that the literal interpretation of Aristotle on substance 
and accident proved the Catholics wrong in the debates on the Eucharist. In Aristotle they 
found the reductionist view that the accidents cannot exist without their natural substance. 
The first explicit reference to Aristotle is in Stevenson’s Theses philosophicae of 1629 but the 
argument is already in Craig 1599 (Gellera 2013: 1095 and 1106).20 The Catholic 
transubstantiation thus has no foundation in Aristotle’s text and the Scottish regents 
celebrated the Calvinist doctrine of the Eucharist as good Aristotelian philosophy. It is 
arguably the first explicit apologetic use of Aristotle in the Scottish universities. 
John Mair’s view of the Christian Aristotle did not last forever. The roots of its eventual 
obsolescence were laid in the sixteenth-century separation of theology and philosophy, 
sanctioned in Melville’s curriculum and never retracted by later academics. The prince of the 
philosophers lost his throne when Aristotelianism was no longer theologically serviceable but 
especially when it ceased to be an effective description of the natural world. Speaking of the 
limits of human nature, the Calvinist doctrine of the Fall prompted a systematic interest in the 
 
20 Stevenson 1629, Th.Log. XVI: ‘accidens ex Porph. semper existit in subjecto, et ex Arist. non potest seursum 
existere ab eo in quo est’; Craig 1599, Th.Log. 21.I: ‘accidentia quae promanant a natura subiecti, eoque a 
subiecto penitus inseparabilia’. 
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application of new philosophical and empirical methods to nature and the mind.21 
Aristotelianism turned from usable to disposable because in Scotland it did not have the same 
intrinsic relationship with theology as in the Catholic world. As a result, by the 1660s there 
was little Aristotelian conservatism in the Scottish universities and the new philosophies of 
Descartes and the English experimentalists were appropriated without raising much concern 
of orthodoxy (Gellera 2016).22 
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